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LEGAL AND OTHER GOVERNANCE
IN SECOND-PERSON PERSPECTIVE
Aaron James*
In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall seeks to
extract a distinctive conception of morality from general features of
"the second-person standpoint"-the "perspective you and I take up
when we make and acknowledge claims on one another's conduct
and will."' The resulting conception is what Darwall calls "morality
as equal accountability"2 : for one to have a specifically moral
obligation is ipso facto for others to have a kind of authority over
one-authority to hold one into account for what one is obligated to
do.
Darwall's project is one of moral theory, but legal authority and
obligation is a paradigm case of the "second-person standpoint" in
Darwall's sense. In making and enforcing the law, it is often said,
the sovereign authority does not simply purport to exercise power,
even justified coercive power: it lays claim to the willing obedience
of its subjects. That is to say, it lays claim not just to compliant
behavior, but to compliance based in acceptance; the subject is to
accept, from his or her own point of view, the sovereign's legitimacy
and his or her own duty to obey? Though law is not Darwall's focus,
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine. For comments or
relevant discussion, I am grateful to William Bristow, Marshall Cohen, Margaret Gilbert,
Nicholas Jolley, and Robin Kar.
1. STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
2. Id. at 101 (emphasis omitted).
3. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80-83, 90 (1961) (distinguishing
between being "obligated" and merely "obliged"); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY, at v (1979); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM ch. 2
(1986) [hereinafter RAZ, MORALITY OF FREEDOM]; see also ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE
OF ANARCHISM (Arthur C. Danto ed., 1970); G.E.M. Anscombe, On the Source of the Authority
of the State, in AUTHORITY 142 (Joseph Raz ed., 1990); Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and ConsentII, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 39 (1966). Some theorists deny that legal authority purports to have a
Hohfeldian "claim-right" to compliance. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW
AND MORALITY (1987); Robert Ladenson, In Defense of a Hobbesian Concept of Law, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 134 (1980). Though I am sympathetic to this denial, I assume for the sake of argument
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this is just the kind of mutually regarding perspective which he takes
to reveal morality's true nature: morality as equal accountability.
This poses the question, How, if at all, do Darwall's arguments apply
to the relation between legal authority and its subjects, and is
morality as equal accountability the result?
I will pursue this question in two stages, by first considering
legal authority and obligation, and then turning to moral obligation
generally. In the case of law, I want to suggest that Darwall's
arguments do naturally apply to legal authority and obligation, at
least in the case of democratic legal authority, but in a way that calls
morality as equal accountability into question. That Darwall's
arguments do apply to law is of interest in its own right. This shows
that moral contractualism (in the Scanlonian form that Darwall
favors) is not simply an alternative to consequentialism at the level
of general moral theory with no direct implications for legal
authority.4
In conjunction with Darwall's arguments, moral
contractualism can in certain cases explain the obligating nature of
law. This is not evidence in favor of morality as equal accountability, however. For there is a better explanation, within contractualism, why Darwall's narrower arguments apply: the narrower
arguments apply given the very nature of democratic governance and
reasons for its legitimacy which give morality as equal accountability
no essential role.
Since law and legitimacy are not Darwall's main concern, there
is some risk of unfairness in making this argument. In the second
part of my discussion, I therefore consider Darwall's arguments in
the context of his primary concern, interpersonal relations. I argue
that there is a general connection between purported legitimate authority and a (purported) duty
of obedience. As I understand it, the purported "duty" involves the subject's having normally
sufficient reason for compliance. This leaves open whether the reason is also "exclusionary," and
it allows for special or extenuating circumstances, including civil disobedience and trivial
violations (such as running the rural three o'clock a.m. stop sign). I also make no assumption
about the direction of explanation, that is, whether the legitimacy of authority depends on
triggering an independent duty of obedience, or whether such a duty instead flows from
independently established legitimate legal authority. I do, however, suggest a version of the later
direction of explanation below.
4. Scanlon's contractualism is as follows: "an act is wrong if and only if any principle that
permitted it would be one that could reasonably be rejected by people [who were moved to find
principles for the general regulation of behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not
reasonably reject]." T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998). Darwall agrees,
but takes morality as equal accountability to be contractualism's foundation. See DARWALL,
supra note 1, ch. 12.
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that, even here, Darwall's central arguments are incomplete, since
they do not effectively rule out what should be seen as the main
contractualist alternative to morality as equal accountability.
According to what I refer to as "morality as self-governance,"
governance of self is basic, while governance of others, in law and in
interpersonal dealings, is less the hallmark of moral obligation than
one of its specifically political dimensions. The possibility of this
view shows that Darwall has not adequately explained why we need
to posit a primitive kind of authority or standing to make demands
beyond a person's general standing as owed justifiable treatment.
In closing, I speculate about the source of this lacuna: Darwall's
relatively uncritical acceptance of an expressivist conception of the
reactive-attitudes.
I. SECOND-PERSONAL REASONS

Darwall's argument begins by examining cases in which some
agent A makes a "claim" or "demand" on the conduct of B (as
expressed, e.g., when one says "Get off my toes," "What do you
think you're doing?," or "Thou shall not kill").5 The claim or
demand assumes that B has certain reasons for action.6 Darwall
argues that B in fact has the purported reason, in the cases in
question, only if several basic, quasi-Austinian "normative felicity
conditions" hold:
(1) A has legitimate, de jure authority or standing to make
such claims against B;
(2) B is accountable to A for compliance, in the sense that,
in case of non-compliance, A has authority or standing to
complain, object, blame, or issue some other
"accountability-seeking response" ("Strawson's Point");7

5. DARWALL, supra note 1, at 5.
6. Darwall stipulates that his interest is solely in cases of "pure" reason-giving, which do
not involve the influence of "nonrational influence-intimidation, seduction, and so on." Id. at
39.
7. Strictly speaking, (2) is not what Darwall names "Strawson's Point," but rather a general
thesis that Darwall seems to regard as implicit in Peter Strawson's famous argument. See P.F.
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 187 (1962), reprinted in
PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 45 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993).
Darwall puts "Strawson's Point" as follows: "Desirability is a reason of the wrong kind to
warrant the attitudes and actions in which holding someone responsible consists in their own
terms." DARWALL, supra note 1, at 15 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 66. However, Darwall
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(3) B is "normatively competent," in the sense that B is
capable of appreciating and being moved by the reasons A
purports to give, and capable of holding him or herself
responsible for acting on these reasons ("Pufendorf s
Point");8
(4) B has authority, the kind of authority which is infringed
if B is not addressed by A legitimately, i.e., in a way that
allows B to comply freely, or by exercise of B's normative
competence ("Fichte's Point").9
According to Darwall, the practical reasons which support these
assumptions comprise a distinctive normative kind, the class of
"second-personal reasons."1 Not all practical reasons are supposed
to be of this sort. There are also reasons to make the world go better
rather than worse, from a purely impersonal point of view. And
there are reasons and requirements which, although "agent-relative"
or "exclusionary," afford others no necessary authority or standing to
make compliance demands." Nevertheless, Darwall argues, in a
wide range of cases-including, but not limited to, reasons
"addressed or presupposed in orders, requests, . . .demands, promises, contracts, givings of consent, commands"' 2 -we do find a
different and distinctive class of reason which presuppose conditions
(1)-(4). In all such cases, Darwall explains, such "second-personal
reasons". "simply wouldn't exist but for their role in second-personal
address."' 3 Their very "validity depends on presupposed authority
and accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the
possibility of the reason's being addressed person-to-person."' 4
This is not yet to say anything about morality. According to
Darwall, moral obligations not only provide reasons for action, the
reasons they provide are second-personal reasons. Moral obligations
does seem to regard this thought as a reason for (2). I question below whether this or any other
instance of the "wrong kind of reason" problem has this upshot.
8. See DARWALL, supra note 1, at 22-24, 111-15, 249-52.
9. See id. at 20-22, ch. 10.

10. Id. at 5-10.
11. For Darwall, moral obligations are a subset of agent-relative requirements. Their
necessary connection to mutual accountability is supposed to explain their agent-relativity. See
id. at8.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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too, then, "simply wouldn't exist"-at least with the full authority
they purport to have-but for "presupposed authority and
accountability relations between persons." 5 One might take this to
entail that moral obligations are artificial, because the "authority and
accountability relations" they presuppose depend on contingent
social organization, in the way legal authority and accountability are
usually thought to. Darwall concludes, instead, that certain authority
and accountability relations are part of moral nature, arising simply
by virtue of the dignity of persons.16
What are these morally basic relations? Darwall's answer is
sometimes misleadingly vague, as for example when he writes:
Second-personal reasons are invariably tied to a
distinctively second-personal kind of practical authority:
the authority to make a demand or claim. Making a claim
or a demand as valid always presupposes [1] the authority
to make it and [2] that the duly authorized claim creates a
distinctive reason for compliance (a second-personal
reason).17
Now [1] is just (1) from above, a plausible claim about any act of
making a claim or demand. But [2] misleadingly suggests that the
act of validly making a claim always "creates" a distinctive reason
for compliance with basic moral requirements, instead of simply
creating a distinctive reason to give an account of independently
motivated conduct. To take Darwall's own example, 8 if you tread
on my toes I can do more than invite you to see that this is a bad
thing to have happen; I can also demand that you step off. Even if I
in some sense "address" a requirement to you-the requirement that
people are not to tread on other people's toes-it is not a requirement
on your conduct because I address it or say so, at least not in the way
sovereign legislation can itself be a reason for doing what the law
requires." The datable act of my making the complaint might
''create" a distinctive reason for you to give an answer or apologize,
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 13-14, 70-99, 213, 242-44..
Id. at 11.
Id. at 5-10.
This is sometimes called "content-independence."

See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON

BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY ch. 10 (1982); RAZ, MORALITY

OF FREEDOM, supra note 3, at 35.
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a reason you might have lacked had I remained silent. It might also
get you to recognize the basic requirement for yourself. But this is
not to say, what a strict reading of [2] suggests, that it also "creates"
a distinctive, specifically moral (or moral obligation-related) reason
for compliance with the basic requirement in the first place. You had
such a reason not to tread on my toes even before I complained, and
would have had this reason had I never piped up. What "creates" the
basic requirement in the first place, in Darwall's view, is nothing less
than the "demands" of the "moral community," which he
understands in hypothetical, contractualist terms (as a demand on
conduct that no one could reasonably reject).2
So we should distinguish authority of at least two kinds. When
a legislature creates legal obligations, or when a married couple or
business partners make binding agreements for how they will get
along, this is to exercise legislative authority-authorityor standing
to create obligations which might not otherwise exist except by some
datable act of will. This is distinct from what may be called
accountability authority--authority to hold someone into account.
When a friend or lover asks for justification for an insensitive
remark, they assume authority or standing to complain, object, and
make demands for greater care. But they do not necessarily assume
that they have legislative authority over the basic standards of care
and sensitivity among friends or lovers to which they hold the
person. Darwall's central thesis is that moral second-personal
reasons always presuppose accountability authority, not legislative
authority. 2
Philosophers do sometimes speak of basic moral requirements
being "legislated."22 One can, for instance, view all moral truth as a
construction of authoritative moral reasoning (e.g., about what could
20. See DARWALL, supra note 1, ch. 11.
21. Robin Kar points out that this remains an important point about law. Robin Kar, How an
Understanding of the Second PersonalStandpoint Can Change Our Understanding of the Law:
Hart's Unpublished Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
Hart's The Concept of Law can be seen as characterizing legislative authority (as the union of
primary rules of conduct and certain power-conferring rules), but he provides no obvious account
of accountability authority. See HART, supra note 3, ch. 5. If Darwall is right, this is an
important omission.
22. Perhaps the most famous example derives from Immanuel Kant who speaks of
legislating for a kingdom of ends. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF

MORALS 38-42 (James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993); CHRISTINE M.
KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 106 (1996).
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be reasonably rejected). In that sense, even basic moral requirements
might be "legislated" by the hypothetical moral community's
demands. The basic requirement not to tread on the toes of others
might then be said to flow ultimately from the fact that I (or others
like me) can reasonably reject any principle which allows this; but
for that fact, we may say, treading on my toes would have been fine.
Even so, this hypothetical fact about what I would reject, if reasonable, is just not an actual, datable act of acceptance or rejection
which can be said to legislate or "create" reasons for action in the
way legal authority and binding agreements do. If this counts as
"legislation," it is not legislation in the ordinary legal sense, but a
philosophically suggestive metaphor.
So when Darwall says that, in general, a moral second-personal
reason (e.g., to avoid toe-treading) "simply wouldn't exist" but for
"authority and accountability relations,"23 this is not to say what is
often true in law-namely, that an action which is in fact obligatory
would not have been such in the absence of an authority which issues
and enforces it. The idea is instead this: If a principle is to provide a
genuine moral obligation, it must be suitable for a certain role in
practice; it must provide a basis for people to govern each other in
the sense of enabling them to hold each other into account when they
fail on their own to follow through. Moral obligations and the
reasons they provide simply would not exist but for this practical
governing role.
This is a strong claim. It is to deny the moral credentials of even
a close contractualist cousin of Darwall's own view. According to
what might be called morality as self-governance, morality is
essentially "second-personal" in the sense that its defining concern
is, in T.M. Scanlon's sense, "what we owe to each other" or
"justifiability to others."24 Yet the basic moral problem, on this view,
is one of self-governance--of how each is to govern his or her own
conduct. How each is to govern or be governed by others is, by
contrast, an artificial, remedial, or in any case secondary issue. We
need principles concerning the governance of others only because
they are needed for special kinds of political or interpersonal
relationships, or because of real limitations on our ability to properly
23. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
24. SCANLON, supra note 4, at 5-7.
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govern ourselves, or because of some combination of these. On this
view, there is no further general or primitive authority or standing to
issue demands beyond one's general and primitive standing as owed
justifiable treatment.
Morality as equal accountability entails that morality as selfgovernance does not capture moral obligation. But why does it not?
I do not think Darwall has adequately answered this question. To
explain why, I will now consider how his main arguments about the
second-person point of view have natural, plausible, and interesting
application to legal authority in a democratic society. Why the
arguments apply, I suggest, is explained better or just as well by the
nature of democratic legitimacy than by morality as equal
accountability. At least as far as the moral basis of legal authority
and obligation goes, it is unclear why the more general conception of
equal accountability must come into the picture.
II. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

Consider two ways legal authority might be said to have or
approach legitimacy. What is crucial in each case is how each
subject regards the legitimacy of the sovereign's rule.25
Under conditions of Proto-legitimacy, the de facto authority

aims in good faith to set terms in such a way that every subject can
accept the legitimacy of its rule and their own obligation to obey.
Most everyone agrees that it is wise to have some such authority; few
would deny the evils of civil disorder, for example. Beyond modest
confidence that most of those who rule make a good faith effort,
however, there is not necessarily great confidence in how authority is
exercised (though there may be such confidence as well).
Under conditions of Sovereign Legitimacy, the terms legislated
and enforced in good faith are accepted by each subject as legitimate,
and therefore regarded as providing normally sufficient reason to
comply. People generally find the existence of a sovereign to be
wise, as under Proto-legitimacy, but they also generally have

25. My discussion below has some similarity-if only that borne of inspiration-to the
discussions of authority in A.J. Julius, Nagel's Atlas, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 176 (2006), and
Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (2005). I take much of
what I call "Democratic Legitimacy" to be compatible with, and partially an explication of, what
is implicit in JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 131
(1999).
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confidence in the few who rule, largely because of what they find in
practice: things work well enough; people often get along;
arrangements are not too unjust, or not believed to be too unjust; and
so on. Beyond confidence that the rulers are wise, however, there is
not necessarily access to or appreciation of the reasons why the
rulers choose as they do (though there may be such access or
appreciation as well).
Now compare conditions of Democratic Legitimacy. Law, as

set and enforced by the de facto authority, is addressed to each
citizen, seen as its proper subject, and is derived from every citizen,
seen as its joint author. In practice, this regulative ideal is
approximated, and understood to be approximated, under the
following sorts of conditions: (i) the society (at least) achieves both
Proto-legitimacy and Sovereign Legitimacy; (ii) there are sufficiently
fair representative political institutions for distributing political and
legal power; and (iii) the exercise of power, in those positions, is byand-large governed by public reasons-reasons everyone can
reasonably authorize despite their differing private views.26
When these conditions are largely fulfilled, each citizen enjoys
two forms of authority or standing. As coerced subjects of the law,
each has standing to demand from others that law be a possible
object of willing compliance; that is, each has standing to demand
that authoritative decisions be reasonably authorizable and so made
only on the basis of public reasons. As putative co-authors of law,
each has standing to demand compliance from others and, in case of
non-compliance, enforcement by public means of coercive sanction. 7 In short, coercion gives standing to make an authorship
demand, while willing compliance, in the face of coercion, gives
standing to make a compliance demand.

Now, one can have authority or standing to make a demand
without ever making or expressing the demand to others. In that
case, others would not have the reasons they would have if the
demand were made or expressed. We can close this gap as follows.
26. Here I have in mind Rawls's characterization of "public reasons," which Darwall cites
approvingly. DARWALL, supra note 1, at 23; see also id. at 309-10.
27. Coercive sanction is legitimate if only because it is part and parcel of legitimate law, for
instance, because of its justifiable (not reasonably rejectable) role in resolving coordination
problems or in providing reasonable assurance of the compliance of others. Whether such
considerations of legitimacy depend in any way on morality as equal accountability is a question
discussed below.
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Under conditions of Democratic Legitimacy, we may assume more
or less general compliance with law in practice, if only that which is
necessary for the continuing existence of law-governed society.
Such compliance, we may say, is in itself of expressive significance.
One's willing compliance, over time, expresses to others one's
authorship and compliance demands. As a coerced subject of law,
one's compliance expresses one's authorship demand, giving to all
normally sufficient reason to jointly adopt reasonably authorizable
terms. And as a putative co-author of law, one's willing compliance
expresses one's compliance demand, giving to each other normally
sufficient reason also to comply. In willingly complying, each in
effect says to others, "I'm doing it, you do so as well."28
Now consider the relation between our three models and
Darwall's conditions (1)-(4)." 9 Democratic Legitimacy fulfills each
condition. That is, suppose we are not anarchists; the claims of law
on our conduct do indeed give normally sufficient reasons to comply,
if nowhere else, under conditions of Democratic Legitimacy." What
follows from this? One thing that follows, as per (1), is that the
prevailing legal authority has legitimate authority to make legal
claims. In the present case, such authority flows from each coauthoring citizen's compliance demand. With regard to (2), each is
accountable for compliance, by public coercive sanction, given each
complying citizen's authorship demand. As for (3), citizens each
enjoy "normative competence" in a particularly strong sense. Unlike
both Proto-legitimacy and Sovereign Legitimacy, rulers are not
simply wanted and trusted as wise, they are required to govern
according to public reasons-reasons each could appreciate and
reasonably authorize. As for (4), citizens are only legitimately
28. The suggestion here is that one has reason to obey the law because of the expressed
compliance demands of others. It is not the claim, made by some "expressive" theories of
political obligation, that one's own compliance expresses a kind of reason-generating loyalty,
allegiance, or identification with law. The advantage of this approach is that, barring extenuating
circumstances, one can be bound by law simply by being successfully addressed by it. This
avoids the problems raised by both consent-based and natural duty views in specifying the
subject's special relation to law. The special relation is simply that one is successfully addressed
by law, perhaps only by legible markers of a legal system's jurisdiction, such as a borderidentifying sign. As I will not try to defend this approach here, I ignore the many objections that
would need to be addressed.
29. See supra Part I.
30. This assumption is admissible because Darwall's argument is conditional: ifwe have
certain reasons, then certain assumptions must hold (as "normative felicity conditions").
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addressed with the demands of law if they are in effect its joint
author. If law is not grounded in public reasons, which each could
appreciate and reasonably authorize, it fails to respect each
complying citizen's authority or standing as a joint author of law (by
failing to comply with his or her expressed authorship demand).
But now we should ask: What explains why these assumptions
apply? Does morality as equal accountability? Consider a different
hypothesis that I will call the Democracy Hypothesis: assumptions
(1)-(4) flow from the very idea of democratic society, given its
constitutive ideal of collective-self governance, but from little more.
To be sure, we do need to assume that democratic society is itself
legitimate; Democratic Legitimacy must be legitimacy proper. But
according to the present hypothesis, it is enough for legitimate
democratic authority that no one could reasonably reject democratic
society for all the reasons it can seem a good idea-because history
has shown that it tends to be less unjust than authoritarian regimes,
because collective self-governance is a worthy ideal, and so on.
None of these reasons, on the Democracy Hypothesis, include predemocratic rights to be both the subject and author of law, or any
reference to morality as equal accountability.
To see the merit in this hypothesis, consider the alternatives to
Democratic Legitimacy. Proto-legitimacy is not quite legitimate
authority proper. Its subjects plausibly exercise a good deal of
discretion about whether and how standing law applies. Punishment,
if not tempered with generous excusing and extenuating conditions,
would itself be illegitimate. Sovereign Legitimacy, by contrast,
arguably is or can be legitimacy proper. Think of the ancient
Hebrews. Suppose they had reasonable confidence that God is wise
and that the priesthood faithfully determines God's will, even if they
had little access to the reasons why God commands what He
commands. And suppose people reasonably see no other way of
doing things given their religion, culture, traditions, and the
alternative societies they normally encounter or can imagine. It
seems they would each have an obligation to comply with law. The
result may not be justice, but it is not illegitimacy either.
The important point here is not that the ancient Hebrews had no
access to the idea of Democratic Legitimacy, although that is
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probably the case.3' It is that the inaccessibility of alternatives
suggests that Sovereign Legitimacy is, under the circumstances,
genuine legitimacy.32 So understood, the point equally applies to
present-day societies, at least provided suitable qualification.
Qualification is needed because the legitimacy of current authoritarian regimes is hard to defend. Their failures and the alternatives
are now relatively well-known, well-enough known, perhaps, so that
only democratic society could be legitimate. This is not to yet say
that we need to assume pre-democratic rights to be both the subject
and author of law; it may simply be that such rights are afforded by a
democratic society and that any other system of rule, though
legitimate in by-gone eras, is now indefensible (reasonably
rejectable) on independent grounds. Provided these qualifications,
however, it is not implausible to suppose that some existing
authoritarian societies are or would be genuinely legitimate forms of
Sovereign Legitimacy if we assume that they yet lack the culture and
traditions necessary for real and functioning democracy to be
accessible. Legal authority would then (but perhaps only then)
generate a duty to obey.
If this is right, we can infer (1), that, under Sovereign
Legitimacy, the established authority is legitimate. We can also infer
(2), that it can legitimately hold subjects into account for compliance.
But (3) does not follow in the sense Darwall means. Darwall follows
Pufendorf in supposing that authoritative address presumes the
subject's "normative competence"; even God must assume our
ability to appreciate and be moved by the propriety of His demands
from our own point of view.33 But what must "competence" come to
here?
Under Sovereign Legitimacy, the duty to obey could
potentially arise even if the "normative competence" of subjects
comes to little more than acknowledgment (for good reasons) that

3 1. Darwall might agree, given his comment made in a similar vein: "The idea of moral
community between free and rational persons is a significant achievement of relatively recent
human history, and there is no reason to think that it was even available, say, to an ancient Hittite
issuing an order or making a request." DARWALL, supra note 1, at 24.
32. To the passage quoted supra note 31, Darwall adds that certain presuppositions "only
come[] clearly into view retrospectively (although from this latter perspective, the
presuppositions will seem to have always been implicit)." DARWALL, supra note 1, at 25. The
present claim, then, is that "implicitness" does not imply "accessibility" in the sense that
constrains legitimacy.
33. DARWALL, supra note 1, at 111- 15.
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authorities are wise. Rulers are not limited to governing on
reasonably authorizable, public reasons. So subjects may not even in
principle have access to the grounds of authoritative decision as they
must under Democratic Legitimacy. Nor, then, does (4) hold. There
is, ex hypothesi, no sense in which subjects are recognized as having
authority which is infringed unless the grounds of authoritative
decision are available to them. Yet, it seems, subjects have a duty to
obey.
What does all of this show? It supports the Democracy Hypothesis by suggesting that (3) and (4) hold mainly because of the
special way the relation between sovereign and subject is understood
in democratic society. They do not come along with the mere
assumption that legal authority generates a duty to obey. Thus we
seem to have genuine moral obligation, as a result of manifestly
"second-personal" address, but without the robust standing or
authority that Darwall defends.
Darwall does consider analogous cases of "hierarchical"
authority, such as the authority assumed when a sergeant orders a
private to "fall in."13 4 Drawing from Fichte, Darwall argues that, even

here, we find a basis for (4). The sergeant's act of address, which
purports, by that very act, to give the private reason to fall in,
presumes a common, underlying authority which each must share
simply as "free and rational persons."35 But as I will presently
explain, because of certain ambiguities in the idea of "normative
competence," Darwall overstates how much competence the private
needs to have.
Darwall's starting point is Fichte's basic thought that orders

addressed from one person to another are by their very nature
between persons. You cannot intelligibly order a chair to move, and
even if you order a dog to sit, this is not to exercise the kind of
authority assumed when the sergeant orders the private to fall in. 6
The private must be "rational" in a sense the dog is not and must be
able to comply "freely" in a sense the dog cannot. For, as with any
exercise of authority (as distinct from mere power), the sergeant's
order asks the private to see for himself that the order is a reason for
34. Id. at 259-62.
35. Id. at 258.
36. Indeed, for Darwall, this is not genuine authority or second-personal address at all. See
id. at 39-40, 43 (dog and cat examples).
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action; in Darwall's terms, it "summons" his own "normative
competence." And since the putative reason (to fall in now because
the sergeant just said so) would not be valid in the absence of an
authority structure (in which privates are to do as sergeants say), the
private will see the reason for himself only if he regards the larger
authority structure as itself legitimate.
So far, so good. What can we conclude from this? According to
Darwall, it means that the reason in question is "properly conceived"
in a way that any rational person would have to take it, as "addressed
to a person-who-happens-to-stand-in-that-specific-putatively-normative-relation."3 7 That is, regardless of what the private does in fact
accept, he has to be able, at least in principle, to accept the reason
and its associated structure from a "generalized perspective."38 He
should be able, "as a rational person," to "accept [the] normative
relation in general and, as a consequence, accept the sergeant's
authority should he occupy, as he does, the position of private."39
This may seem like a lot for privates to have very clearly in mind.
But it is not beyond their "normative competence" as Darwall
generously construes that idea. All it takes for this is that people
have "a process of reasoning available to them through which they
could, in principle, have determined the validity of relevant secondpersonal reasons and been motivated to act on them."4 Since it is up
to us to decide what is rationally acceptable, we have a relatively free
hand.
But is "normative competence" in this broad sense really a
It is fairly
necessary condition for legitimate authority?
uncontroversial to say that legitimacy is independent of actual
acceptance. Structures can be legitimate although their subjects do
not in fact accept them (think of anarchists in legitimate
democracies), and people can accept the legitimacy of illegitimate
structures (e.g., the slave who believes he deserves no better).
Nevertheless, this does not entail Darwall's capacious notion of
"rational acceptability," and more restrictive notions seem to suffice
for legitimate (even if ultimately unjust) authority. Consider again
the Hebrews. Even if we grant that rational persons could not accept
37. Id. at 270-71; see also id. at 260, 269.
38. See id. at 271.
39. Id. at 270.
40. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
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theocratic Sovereign Legitimacy from a "generalized perspective,"
we might feel that any reasonable person would admit its rational
acceptability in the Hebrews' particular historical and cultural
position as informed by what people then generally knew, the
alternatives they could imagine and usually encountered, and so on.
Similarly, what is at issue with the private is whether rational persons
regard military authority as rationally acceptable for the private in his
or her particularsituation. Given the point of view of the normal
(say, American) private, and given his or her particular, historically
specific, culturally informed point of view, this would seem hard to
deny. Certainly, acceptance is not clearly irrational or unreasonable.
And so just as the ancient Hebrews seem to have had a duty to obey,
this seems enough for military authority to give its privates real (but
Justice is presumably not so
perhaps defeasible) obligations.
constrained; it may be determined only by what free and equal moral
persons would choose from a "generalized perspective," or from
behind a veil of ignorance, or some such. But compared to justice,
legitimacy is a much lower bar.4
So the Democratic Hypothesis stands. We have at least one kind
of case in which manifestly second-personal address does not clearly
imply morality as equal accountability.
III. MORALITY AS SELF-GOVERNANCE

Darwall never makes any official claim about legal authority
and its legitimacy, so although he presumably must think morality as
equal accountability has something to do with legitimacy, there are
probably many ways a connection can be forged. So Darwall can
still insist that, insofar as legitimacy is moral, or involves moral
obligations, a connection must be forged somewhere. 2 However, the
point I have been highlighting points to a similar limitation in
Darwall's larger argument for morality as equal accountability: even
41. Rawls goes so far as to take contextually-informed reasonable acceptability to place a
constraint on original position reasoning. The purpose of John Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism is to
show that it can meet even this constraint, and to show that egalitarian justice is legitimate within
modem constitutional democracies, despite reasonable pluralism even about justice. See JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
42. Darwall makes this point against Raz's "normal justification thesis" in his unpublished
paper, Authority and Second-Personal Reasons for Acting. See Stephen Darwall, Professor of
Philosophy, Univ. of Mich., Authority and Second-Personal Reasons for Acting, Lecture at the
Practical Reason Conference at Bowling Green State University (Apr. 7-8, 2006), http://
www.bgsu.edu/departments/phil/reasonconf/Papers/darwall.pdf.
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with regard to interpersonal relations, there are other ways of
capturing the plausibility and appeal of Darwall's main arguments,
which Darwall never clearly rules out.
The alternative I mentioned above is a contractualist conception
of morality as self-governance. Its importance, in the present
context, lies in how much it shares with Darwall's conception. Both
views are governance conceptions. They agree that the basic point of
having moral principles at all is the governance of human conduct in
practice, quite aside from what states of the world simply happen to
come about. Both views are contractualist in Scanlon's sense; they
agree that these principles are just those no one could reasonably
reject for governance in practice. And they agree that reasonable
rejectability is essentially an idealization of cases of person-to-person
justification. When you ask me "How could you do that?," having
been injured by something I did, I am moved not only to rehearse my
motives, but to give reasons which made me justified; I try to justify
my action to you. In Scanlon's terms, I try to show that what I did
comports with principles no one could reasonably reject for the
situation I was in. Thus, on both views, morality (in the relevant,
central sense) is essentially "second-personal" in the sense that it is
at bottom about justification to, and between, persons.
The difference between the two conceptions arises over what is
the most basic problem of governance, and so what principles are in
practice principles for. According to morality as equal accountability, the basic problem is how we are to govern each other and
when. According to morality as self-governance, it is how we each
are to govern ourselves in light of the fact that what we do affects
others. Relations of authority and accountability, which allow us to
share in or influence how others govern themselves, are secondary,
arising within special political or interpersonal relationships, or as
remedies to human limitations on self-governance, or some
combination of these.
The strength of the latter, self-governance conception, is that we
clearly need principles to apply even when our conduct affects
unspecified others at a distance. In a wide range of cases, the people
our conduct affects will be in no position to influence or intervene in
our choices by complaining, objecting, or asking for justification.
Good governance is largely or entirely up to us. The challenge, for
this conception, is to explain why the influence or interventions we
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take to be central to most regularized relationships is somehow
secondary to the kind of self-regulation we expect people to maintain
by themselves.
The strength of the former, co-governance conception is that it
avoids this challenge. Governance of others is in the first instance
governance of specified others within specific relationships, which
by their very nature recognize one as having standing or authority to
so govern. The co-governance conception, however, generalizes
from such cases to all relations between persons. The challenge,
then, is to explain how or in what sense people could have standing
or authority to govern others outside of the relationships and
interactions needed for its practical exercise.
The self-governance conception can step up to its challenge by
arguing that relations of authority and accountability arise largely
because of human limits on governing ourselves all by ourselves.
Imagine a community of saints, or a loving, tried and true couple, in
which each party regularly gives the other his or her due with little
effort. In the unusual case of failure, self-correction comes relatively
quickly. Though it rarely or never happens in real life, no practical
need for others to have authority or standing to make demands or
hold accountable would arise. Given that the need usually does
arise, we have a natural explanation why: we need principles of cogovernance mainly because people cannot generally be relied upon
to treat others perfectly well without a certain amount of help. There
are things we did not notice; we never thought of a certain argument
or perspective before; something basic slipped by in one's youth;
power corrupts and blinds; and so on.43
To be sure, human limitations on self-governance are
themselves a general and predictable component of human life.
They are indeed "all too human." But the above examples suggest
that they are in any case not a general fact of life which conditions
genuine moral obligation in principle; we could still have moral
obligations even if we were better at self-government than we
usually are. Moreover, it is not clear that our general limitations take
43. Does this mean that penalties for negligence are justified merely because of their
helpfulness-that is, for the agent-neutral reason that things go better if penalties are in place?
Not necessarily. Requirements to provide compensation for negligent conduct can still be
justified in other terms, e.g., on grounds of fairness. If, however, there is a kind of standing to
demand compensation for negligent conduct, it is to be analyzed as below in either relationshipsensitive or duty-reflecting terms.
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any interesting general form other than what the present conception
would predict. On the self-governance conception, we should expect
social forms to be as various and circumstantial as the personal,
social, or large-scale political and co-governance problems we
actually face. Perhaps certain authority and accountability structures,
such as those associated with promising, are so important for any
human interaction that we always have a duty to create them if they
are not already understood. But if so, this is the exception that
proves the rule. Especially if we take in the long view of history,
diversity of social forms is arguably what we find.
Such artificiality sometimes strikes people as incompatible with
genuine morality; Hume's view that the applicability of justice
requires a scheme of property is often received this way, for
example." But, on the present proposal, there is no sense in which
genuine morality somehow emerges from mere artifice. Within a
larger contractualist framework, the principles which are to govern
conduct within social structures, or the structures themselves, are
always a matter of what is justifiable to persons. At first blush, this
would seem sufficient to capture genuine morality and moral
obligation, even if we assume no specific relations of accountability.
The hypothetical situation in which functioning relations of authority
and accountability never apply, because we do just fine governing
ourselves by ourselves, is not the total absence of moral obligation,
but the universal rein of moral excellence.
A defense of morality as equal accountability depends, then, on
showing that something essential to genuine moral obligation has
been left out. Along these lines, one of Darwall's particularly
attractive lines of argument takes the form of a challenge-the
challenge to explain basic respect for persons, as expressed in the
immediate and often unavoidable demand we make on each other for
recognition. Many forms of relationship, including friendship,
partnership, marriage, and citizenship, implicitly accord special
"standing" to complain. For much the same reason, outsiders who
object to internal dealings are sometimes dismissed as having little
"say." Drawing on Fichte, Darwall vividly brings out how at least
some such basic forms of standing cannot depend on a "relationship"
44. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 532-52 (Ernest C. Mossner ed.,
Penguin Books 1985) (1739).
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in any ordinary sense. A person I encounter can make genuine,
special demands on my attention, just by catching my eyes with a sad
and questioning gaze. If I avert my eyes, the person's request,
"excuse me," will call for more than the usual politeness; barring
special justification, it would be wrongfully disrespectful for me to
continue to look away. But it seems that such a person needs to be
no more than a person to so command or (in Kant's term) "exact"
recognition from me. If we do not have general standing as persons
to make just such demands, as a basic fact of moral life, how then is
it to be explained?
It turns out that there is a way of treating obligations to
recognize others as generated by a specific, if minimal, kind of
relationship or relating. As Darwall explains in an extended footnote, Fichte himself was tempted toward something like this view.45
On the most plausible version of Fichte's "voluntarism," it is, as
Darwall puts it, "the fact of recognition that obligates."46 The idea,
as I understand it, is that Fichte's principle that "I must in all cases
recognize the free being outside me as a free being" depends on my
having already "recognized" someone in an independent, protoobligatory sense; I must have attended to him instead of other
objects; I must have seen him as a self-conscious being and not as a
mere object, animal, or lower animal; and so on. It is only provided
such awareness that one acquires an obligation to give the noticed
someone a special role in one's deliberation and conduct, i.e., to
recognize him "as a free being" "in all cases," even when
disregarding him would be to one's gain. This is quite compatible
with Kant's claim, which Darwall quotes approvingly, that a rational
person "possesses a dignity . . . by which he exacts respect for
himself from all other rational beings in the world."47 The claim can
be read this way: a rational person possesses a dignity by which she
could, if she encountered them, exact respect for herself from all the
other rational beings in the world (or at least from "any" of the other
rational beings, since one presumably cannot encounter all of them
within a single lifetime).

45. See DARWALL, supra note 1, at 262 n.26.
46. Id. at 264 n.26.
47. Id. at 263 n.26 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 435 (Preussische Akademie 1996)) (emphasis omitted).
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Darwall objects that this provides "no coherent alternative" to
his own view that recognition "presupposes, rather than somehow
creates" the normative standing to demand recognition. 48 For any
demand someone actually makes on my attention, on some occasion,
presupposes his standing to make such demands, independently of
my encounter with him. To be a person is to be "in a position" to
exact respect, before, as it were, it is ever exacted. 9 Yet a lot would
seem to depend on what actual position a person is in. It is one thing
if you are "in my face," making demands I cannot ignore. It is quite
another matter if I have some say in whether you come to my
attention in the first place. I can avoid going where I might see you,
not answer the phone, and so on. Perhaps avoidance of a specified
person betrays recognition of his or her standing, and only fails to
create an occasion for its exercise. But I can also avoid going to any
number of places where as of now unspecified persons would be in a
position to exact respect from me, were I to encounter them. Yet
they may now and forever be unable to in fact do so, simply because
we will never interact. They are not and will never be "in a position"
to exact respect from me.
No doubt there is still a lot I owe to strangers I will never meet
(e.g., giving to foreign aid). In this sense, they have standing many
mere animals lack. But what does such "standing" come to, other
than the fact that what I do must be justifiable to them? If this is all
it comes to, it is something both self-governance and equal accountability contractualism will accept. Why must a further kind of
standing or authority come into the picture?
Darwall will say that the present picture still does not capture
the special dignity persons enjoy as persons, quite aside from special,
authority-conferring relationships. He writes:
Dignity is not just a set of requirements with respect to
persons ....
Someone might accept the first-order norms
that structure the dignity of persons and regulate himself
48. Id. at 265 n.26.
49. Id. at 264 n.26. Darwall levels a version of this objection ("Cudworth's Point") against
Margaret Gilbert's account of mutual agreement and Scanlon's view of promises. See id. at 20103, 204, 207-08. I have doubts here similar to those I go on to express in the text, but I leave
them aside here. Even if they are mistaken, and Darwall is right about the special cases of mutual
agreements or promises, this will not establish his larger claims about all moral obligation. The
argument against Fichte does, however, promise to reorient us to morality generally, by
suggesting an interpretation of the dignity of persons.
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scrupulously by them without accepting anyone's authority
to demand that he do so.... I claim, however, that he
would not yet fully acknowledge the dignity of persons or
respect persons for their dignity."°
But it is not clear why this should be so. "[F]irst-order norms that
structure the dignity of persons"5 can include not only requirements
not to injure, coerce, or manipulate people, but also requirements to
pay attention to them and listen to their complaints or demands.
I will not have to pay attention or listen very long if you
complain needlessly and incessantly, even if you are sincere. I may
be free to avoid you if I hear through the grapevine that you intend to
make clearly unreasonable demands on me and my time. In other
cases, when you voice a complaint, I must notice you and hear you
out. I owe you this much, as a duty of respect for you as a personeven if I have done nothing wrong. But such "duties of recognition"
can be justified like any other norms of rightful treatment, only for
particular contexts of interaction-political structures, personal
relationships, and special communicative contexts, including passing
glances.
We can add, if we like, that my duties of recognition give you
authority or standing to complain, in the sense that the act of
complaining, on the appropriate occasion, can trigger my duty to
recognize you, or listen to what you say. But even here the dignity
and authority you enjoy can simply reflect my independently
justified requirements of respectful treatment. Why must any further
authority, beyond the interests of yours, which ground my
requirements, be involved? Why must your "standing" be anything
more than your standing as owed justifiable treatment, along with the
principles of recognition that dictate when I must attend, listen, or
give answers to you?
This limited conception of dignity is compatible with the claim,
familiar from the case of legal rights, that certain rights are by their
very nature something the right-holder has standing to claim. 2 It
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id.
52. See Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243 (1979),
reprinted in JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 143 (1980).

Darwall cites Feinberg approvingly, treating legal claim-rights as an easy case for his analysis.
See DARWALL, supra note 1,at 18.
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may even be that no mere duty could justify this standing by itself 3
The current suggestion, then, is that it is not clear why standing to be
recognized should be modeled in any direct way on such claimable
rights. Rights become claimable because a practice or structure
implicitly recognizes the rights-bearer as a co-governing member.
When some such social and authority structure is not in place, the
standing we have to command or exact recognition is real, but of a
different kind.
Darwall might object that this mischaracterizes basic encounters.
It might be argued, for instance, that the supposed alternative picture
still gives you no standing to complain or demand recognition when I
wrongly ignore you and violate my very duty of recognition itself.
That is why authority cannot just reflect requirements. But this
special case can be handled in much the same way. When I fail my
duty to listen, you have a right to complain, under that very duty.
You simply complain twice. Instead of speaking directly to the first
wrong done----"You're stepping on my toes"-on the assumption that
I must listen to your complaint, you explicitly invoke that assumed
duty in your complaint. You add: "Hey, I'm talking to you."
In sum, on the alternative picture I am suggesting, the dignity of
persons is fully explained by the following three elements: (i) each
person's status as owed justifiable treatment, that is, as owed
compliance with principles no one could reasonably reject; (ii) each
person's general interest in having some say in the conduct of others,
an interest which differentially informs reasoning about what
principles are reasonably rejectable, according to the specific context
of the interaction in question; (iii) duties of recognition, that is, the
fully specified principles governing the complaints and demands of
others, for specific contexts of interaction (including both one-off,
person-to-person encounters, as well as specific, authority-conferring
regularized relationships, such as friendship, marriage, and
citizenship). Darwall's thesis is the strong claim that, without adding
further general and basic authority to hold others accountable, we
cannot yet speak of genuinely moral obligations. But this seems too
strong.

53.

See, e.g., MARGARET GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: MEMBERSHIP,

COMMITMENT, AND THE BONDS OF SOCIETY 162-63 (2006); Margaret Gilbert, Scanlon on
Promissory Obligation: The Problem ofPromisees'Rights, 101 J. PHIL. 83 (2004).
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Darwall does develop one line of argument, the "wrong kind of
reason" problem, which has the potential to establish his strong
claim. 4 Following P.F. Strawson, Darwall argues that, since
consequentialists appeal only to the impersonal goodness and
badness of states of affairs, they do not give reasons of the right kind
to justify moral principles. The mere fact that some outcome would
be good to have happen does not show that someone is appropriately
held accountable for bringing it about. What is needed to give the
"right kind of reason," Darwall proposes, is the further claim that it
would be reasonable to expect this of someone, and thus reasonable
to hold them accountable when or if they fall short of this." This
does not yet hurt the duty-based account of dignity outlined above,
which does not assume consequentialism. But since that account is a
creature of Scanlon's contractualism, Darwall's reply can be what he
argues anyway, that Scanlon's contractualism also runs afoul of the
"wrong kind of reason" problem.
On the status of our basic reason to act only in ways that are
justifiable to persons, Darwall reads Scanlon as closely aligned with
Mill:
Roughly, for Mill, it is because of the desirability of living
in unity with others that considerations of right (which are
themselves based indirectly on the general happiness) give
us reasons to act. Similarly, for Scanlon, it is because of
the value or appeal that we take living with others on terms
of mutual recognition and respect to have that
considerations of right (and, relatedly, of what is
reasonable) are reason-giving and, indeed, have priority for
56

us.

Darwall objects as follows: "[I]t is hard to see how, from the fact it
would be desirable for us to treat considerations of right as having
priority over other values ... it can possibly follow that such
considerations actually have this priority. 57 But Scanlon's basic
reason is not best seen as something we are moved by because of the
desirability of being so moved. The requirement to act only in ways

54.
55.
56.
57.

See DARWALL, supra note 1, at 15-16, 65-70, 246-49.
See id. at 66.
Id. at 317.
Id.
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that could be justified to others is an "agent-relative" requirement;
though there is (normally conclusive) reason for me to act in the
appropriate ways, this is not equally a reason for me to get you to act
the appropriate ways. Scanlon's claim is that, in acting on this
reason, we thereby value other people, in the sense of respecting
them as persons. We do not act on this reason, as Darwall suggests,
for the sake of desirable states of affairs. 8
Darwall also presses a second objection: "[I]t is hard to see how
its being desirable that we relate to one another on terms of mutual
accountability can possibly ground the distinctively second-personal
claim that we are mutually accountable."5 9 While it is true that
separate principles need to be justified according to our contextuallyvarying interests in holding people accountable, when such
principles do require us to recognize others and thereby give them
standing to complain, this is not a mere matter of desirability. It is a
matter of what no one could reasonably reject, given the various
contexts in which we need to be allowed to influence and intervene
in others' conduct and mental affairs. Yet this does ground the
"distinctively second-personal claim that we are mutually
accountable." 6 In practice, we can address requirements to each
other second-personally in Darwall's special sense. When I ignore
you, you can rightfully demand that I take notice and listen in a way
that calls upon my own appreciation of what I owe to you. But such
"appreciation" is just this: seeing or being brought to see my duty, I
hear you out. The duty I appreciate is not my duty because you say
so or address it to me.
IV. EXPRESSIVISM ABOUT BLAME
Thus, I do not see that Darwall has succeeded in ruling out what
would seem the most important alternative to his view. The source
of this lacuna, I suggest, is Darwall's relatively uncritical acceptance
of an "expressivist" conception of the reactive-attitudes.

58. Indeed, I take it that this combination of Scanlon's "buck-passing account" of value and
the basis of moral motivation is the central proposal of Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other.
This completes Scanlon's contractualism as an alternative to consequentialism; it is an alternative,
not only at the level of rightness and wrongness, but also at the level of value and its relation to
right and wrong. See SCANLON, supra note 4.
59. DARWALL, supra note 1, at 317.
60. Id.
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Following Strawson and Watson, Darwall focuses on the role we
often give reactive-attitudes such as blame in expressed demands for
accountability.61 I voice or express blame, for example, in asking
you to apologize for your action. According to Darwall, this is not
simply to express an attitude whose nature can be characterized
independently of such forms of expression (for example, as belief
can be characterized independently of belief reports). Rather, the
very nature of a reaction such as blame is to be understood in terms
of its role in, or suitability for, expressed accountability demands.
Even when blame is not voiced or expressed, by a datable act of
communication, it remains a form of "accountability-seeking"
address, if only "implicitly."
It is this expressivist conception which allows Darwall both to
link obligation and accountability, and to draw conclusions about the
presumed capacities of the agents we hold accountable. Everyone
will agree that being morally responsible, for the fulfillment of some
moral obligation, implies the appropriateness of praise or blame in
principle. But if blame is always at least an "implicit" form of
"accountability-seeking" address or communication, it follows that
the morally responsible person is always appropriately held
accountable by some such (perhaps only implicit) form of address. It
in turn follows that a reaction such as blame is pointless unless it is
assumed that blamed persons can be moved to hold themselves
accountable for the presumed wrong done. As Watson puts the
point: "The reactive attitudes are incipiently forms of
communication, which make sense only on the assumption that the
other can comprehend the message."62
Even if all of this follows given expressivism, the essential
question is why we should favor expressivism in the first place.
Why should blame be understood in terms of its role in cogovernance rather than in some other way? In recent unpublished
work, Scanlon proposes a non-expressivist conception, which he puts
as follows:

61. See Strawson, supra note 7, at 45; Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil:
Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 256
(Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1987), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
119 (John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza eds., 1993).
62. Watson, supra note 61, at 127.
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[T]o claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to
claim that that action shows something about the agent's
attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others
can have with him or her. To blame a person is to judge
him or her to be blameworthy and to take your relationship
with him or her to be modified in a way that this judgment
of impaired relations holds to be appropriate.6 3
According to Scanlon:
[B]lame itself-the revision of one's attitudes toward a
person in response to attitudes expressed in his behavioris not, even incipiently, a form of communication.
Expressions of blame are, and they may be pointless if the
person cannot appreciate their force. But this does not, in
my view, make blame itself inappropriate.'
As Scanlon illustrates, in blaming someone, one need not
express any moral emotion; one "might just feel sad."65
Blame in such unexpressed forms can have an important role in
self-governance. For instance, feeling sad because of how you have
mistreated me, I may be led to distance myself from you, or to decide
that our relationship will be less important to me than it was. The
expressivist can happily admit that unexpressed but incipiently
communicative attitudes will often justify such responses. But here
we may ask: Why is incipient communication necessary, even in
principle, for blame to have its guiding role? In distancing myself
from you, I might mean to protest, that is, to show you that you
cannot treat me or others as you have. But I might also want our
relationship simply to end. If I mean just to move on, I may have no
message to send, and, indeed, it may be necessary that I not try to
send one.66
Darwall sometimes seems to assume that expressivism follows
from the "wrong kind of reason" argument as against the
consequentialist.67 Or perhaps it is supposed to follow from the
63. T.M. Scanlon, Blame 8 (Nov. 9, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, http://www3.law.nyu
.edu/clppt/program2006/readings/Blame,NYU.pdf).
64. Id. at 63 n.46.
65. Id. at 14.
66. This line of argument was suggested to me by Robin Kar.
67. Darwall asserts the centrality of accountability to moral obligation after making
"Strawson's Point" as against the consequentialist. E.g., DARWALL, supra note 1, at 15-16, 6566. The conclusion could instead be simply that impersonal desirability is irrelevant to whether
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argument as applied to any interest-based justification of
accountability relations, including the contractualist one I have
outlined. As we have seen, however, the argument just does not
have this force.
The contractualist justifies relations of
accountability squarely within the space of what is justifiable to
persons on grounds which are of the right kind.6"
The dispute between expressivist and non-expressivist
conceptions is at the moment relatively undeveloped. I do not mean
to prematurely take sides. I do want to suggest that this dispute is of
central importance for how we are to understand the essential
governance function of moral principles, even from within the
"second-person point of view." If morality as equal accountability is
to apply beyond the legal and other contexts in which it has natural
application, a defense of expressivism should take center stage.

we are in fact morally responsible, whether there is any further general relation between moral
responsibility and moral accountability.
68. I find Darwall's use of the "wrong kind of reasons" argument more effective against
Derek Parfit's "Kantian Contractualism." Parfit claims that Kantian Contractualism implies ruleconsequentialism. See id. at 310-11. Darwall's reply is that Parfit's appeal to the rationality of
self-sacrifice for the impersonal good does not provide a basis of mutual accountability; we
cannot reasonably hold someone accountable for refusing to sacrifice themselves for the greater
good. See id. at 311-13. But self-governance contractualists can make much the same claim
without the appeal to accountability per se. It is enough that we cannot reasonably expect selfsacrifice for the impersonal good, whatever this says about accountability.
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